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Responding to the Detroit Water Crisis: The Great 
Lakes Water Authority and the City of Detroit 
Claire Sabourin

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2014, nineteen thousand Detroit residents were 
left without access to water.
1
 Widely known as “water shutoffs”, the 
city of Detroit purposefully cut off individual’s access to the city’s 
water supply if their accounts were delinquent or overdue.
2
 In a June 
25 press release, the UN Office of the High Commissioner published 
a press release calling the water shutoffs, “an affront to human 
rights.”3 
 
  JD, MSW (2016), Washington University School of Law and George Warren Brown 
School of Social Work. Thank you to my family and friends, especially my mother and partner 
who provided instrumental feedback on this project. Importantly, I would like to acknowledge 
the strength and resilience of those living in Detroit and throughout Michigan who experience 
the impact of the decisions made regarding their water distribution firsthand.  
 1. Before a month-long moratorium that lasted from July until the end of August 2014, 
nineteen thousand residents had their water shut off. Matt Helms & Joe Guillen, Judge Says No 
to Detroit Water Shutoff Moratorium, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 29, 2014, 6:43 PM), 
http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/detroit-bankruptcy/2014/09/29/water-shutoff-moratorium/ 
16451483/; U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Comm’r, Detroit: Disconnecting Water 
from People Who Cannot Pay—An Affront to Human Rights, Says UN Experts, OHCHR (June 
25, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14777 
&LangID=E. 
 2. Id. 
 3. U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Comm’r, supra note 1. The title of the press 
release labeled the shutoff as “an affront to human rights.” Id. The press release went on to 
explain: 
Three UN experts on the human rights to water and sanitation, adequate housing, and 
extreme poverty and human rights expressed concern Wednesday about reports of 
widespread water disconnections in the US city of Detroit of households unable to pay 
water bills. “Disconnection of water services because of failure to pay due to lack of 
means constitutes a violation of the human right to water and other international 
human rights,” the experts said. “Disconnections due to non-payment are only 
permissible if it can be shown that the resident is able to pay but is not paying. In other 
words, when there is genuine inability to pay, human rights simply forbids 
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Beginning earlier that year, in March 2014, the Detroit Water and 
Sewerage Department (DWSD) started shutting off the water of 
customers with delinquent or overdue accounts.
4
 The shutoffs 
continued into the summer, and on June 18, 2014, a coalition of 
Detroit organizations
5
 submitted a report to the Special Rapporteur on 
the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation.
6
 In this 
report, the coalition detailed how the water shutoffs disparately 
affected people of color and those of lower socioeconomic status.
7
 In 
a 2014 Census Bureau report, Detroit was shown to be the most 
impoverished big city in the United States, with 39.3 percent of 
people living below the poverty line.
8
 The city of Detroit responded 
suggesting that allowing customers with delinquent bills to continue 
to be served would create a culture of further delinquency.
9
  
 
disconnections,” said Catarina de Albuquerque, the expert on the human right to water 
and sanitation. 
Id. 
 4. Anna Clark, Going Without Water in Detroit, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/04/opinion/going-without-water-in-detroit.html?_r=0. 
 5. The coalition includes the founder of Blue Planet Project and Chair of Food & Water 
Watch (Maude Barlow), the Michigan Welfare Rights Organization, and the Detroit People’s 
Water Board. PEOPLE’S WATER BOARD ET AL., SUBMISSION TO THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON 
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO SAFE DRINKING WATER AND SANITATION REGARDING WATER CUT-
OFFS IN THE CITY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN 4 (June 18, 2014), available at http://www. 
blueplanetproject.net/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/Detroit-HRTW-submission-June-18-2014. 
pdf. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 3.  
The case of water cut-offs in the City of Detroit speaks to the deep racial divides and 
intractable economic and social inequality in access to services within the United 
States. The burden of paying for city services has fallen onto the residents who have 
stayed within the economically depressed city, most of whom are African-American. 
Id. 
 8. Karen Bouffard, Census Bureau: Detroit IS Poorest Big City in U.S., DETROIT NEWS 
(Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/09/16/census-
us-uninsured-drops-income-stagnates/32499231/ (The poverty line for a family of four is 
$24,008. A “big city” for this purpose has a population of more than three hundred thousand 
people).  
 9. Sarah Cwiek, Detroit Is Shutting Off Water to Delinquent Customers. But Is Everyone 
Getting the Same Treatment?, MICH. RADIO (July 10, 2014), http://michiganradio.org/post/ 
detroit-shutting-water-delinquent-customers-everyone-getting-same-treatment#stream/0 (“But 
[Detroit Emergency Manager Kevyn] Orr and water department officials insist they’re not 
targeting the poor. They say the water department hasn’t followed through on shutoff notices 
for too long—and too many people got used to just ignoring their water bill.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/17
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Nearly one year before the shutoffs began, the city of Detroit filed 
bankruptcy, the largest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history.
10
 In 
October 2014, Detroit and the surrounding suburbs reached a long 
debated Great Lakes Water Authority (GLWA) agreement to manage 
water supply and sewage disposal, and the aging water and sewerage 
infrastructure.
11
 The bankruptcy court created this water authority as 
part of what was dubbed the “grand bargain”12 to save Detroit.13 The 
GLWA is a “special purpose government,”14 and despite this 
technically being a governmental body, the creation of the authority 
resulted in the privatization of water and sewerage services in 
southeastern Michigan.
15
 This type of government likely cannot 
address the complexity of the problems facing the Detroit water 
infrastructure and the community facing the water shut-offs.
16
  
It is important to incorporate multiple approaches and methods to 
create a constructive response to the water crisis in Detroit.
17
 For one, 
the Michigan government should not rely on a special purpose 
government unit approach, which tends to isolate one issue and focus 
on it as if the issue is not affected by other problems in the 
community.
18
 Instead, this Note proposes that Detroit and the 
surrounding area should create a representative institution that allows 
for democratically elected representation proportionate to the 
community the government serves and takes into account the most 
 
 10. Michael A. Fletcher, Detroit Files Largest Municipal Bankruptcy in U.S. History, 
WASH. POST (July 18, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/2013/07/18/ 
a8db3f0e-efe6-11e2-bed3-b9b6fe264871_story.html. 
 11. John Turk, Oakland and Macomb Counties Officially Approve Great Lakes Water 
Authority, OAKLAND PRESS (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.theoaklandpress.com/government-and-
politics/20141009/oakland-and-macomb-counties-officially-approve-great-lakes-water-authority. 
 12. Jennifer Chambers, First Payment Made Toward Detroit’s ‘Grand Bargain’, DETROIT 
NEWS (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/wayne-county/2014/12/ 
11/first-payment-made-toward-detroits-grand-bargain/20240369/. 
 13. Turk, supra note 11. 
 14. Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1781 (2002) 
[hereinafter Frug, Beyond Regional Government]. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See id. at 1783–84, 1788 (outlining critiques of special purpose governments and 
arguing for governmental approaches other than special purpose governments for metropolitan 
areas). 
 17. Id. at 1788. 
 18. Id. at 1787–88 (“[Special purpose governments] leave permanently off the table the 
most divisive issues facing metropolitan America—schools, crime, housing, jobs, and taxes.”). 
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adversely affected individuals and the myriad factors related to and 
affected by water distribution.
19
 
In addition to this representative institution, an advisory 
committee should be organized to allow for more community input.
20
 
Communities from each county would have multiple members, and 
each member would have an opportunity to bring important issues 
facing their area to the attention of the committee, which would then 
present these issues and propose possible solutions to the 
representative institution. These issues need not be directly related to 
the physical distribution of water, but could be anything that affects 
the distribution and reception of water services, such as the vast 
number of water main breakages that interfere with the delivery of 
water to customers and the inability of some residents to pay for 
services. 
Part I of this Note looks at the history of the Detroit water system, 
the former management of this system, and the substantial hardships 
the Detroit community faces. This part specifically focuses on the 
Detroit Water and Sewerage Department residential water shutoffs 
that arose as a result of the dilapidated Detroit City water 
infrastructure, high water prices, and the high level of poverty in 
Detroit. Part II focuses on various models of local government and 
how these models approach provision of utilities, specifically in the 
case of cities in bankruptcy, and more broadly, in the case of cities 
facing financial hardships. Part III of this Note focuses on the 
problems arising as a result of the new GLWA and the apparent 
future of water distribution in southeastern Detroit. Part IV considers 
productive alternatives to the GLWA and elements that should be 
considered, particularly in the context of inequities in the Detroit area 
and the need for a working residential water distribution system.  
 
 19. Id. at 1790. 
 20. Barbara L. Bezdek, Citizen Engagement in the Shrinking City: Toward Development 
Justice in an Era of Growing Inequality, 33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 48–49 (2013). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/17
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II. HISTORY 
A. Water and Sewerage in Detroit and Southeastern Michigan 
As of April 2014 the average water pipe in Detroit was eighty-five 
years old, and many of the pipes in the city were over one hundred 
years old.
21
 During the early and mid-1900s, when many of these 
pipes were laid, the Detroit population grew from 993,078 in 1920 to 
1,670,144 in 1960.
22
 Since the 1960s, however, the population of 
Detroit has been steadily declining.
23
 Thus, even though the Detroit 
water system presumably has an infrastructure designed a population 
of 1 million or more, according to 2014 census data, it now only 
serves 680,250 residents in the city.
24
 Despite this presumed capacity, 
there were over 5,000 water main breaks in the three years between 
2011 and 2014.
25
  
Due to the age of the pipes and the disproportionately large water 
and sewerage infrastructure, pipes are deteriorating and water main 
breakages are common.
26
 The breakages and inefficiency of the 
system lead to exceptionally high water bills for residents in the 
 
 21. CITY OF DETROIT WATER AND SEWERAGE DEPARTMENT, WATER MAIN 
REPLACEMENT PROJECT PLAN 9 (2015), available at http://archive.dwsd.org/downloads_n/ 
announcements/hearing_notices/PUBLIC_HEARING_NOTICE_FY_16_DWRF_Handout_03-
26-15.pdf. According to the EPA, 30 percent of pipes that deliver water to communities over 
one hundred thousand people are between forty and eighty years old. The EPA estimates that 10 
percent of pipes in these systems are older. Alison Kosik, Experts: U.S. Water Infrastructure in 
Trouble, CNN (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/01/20/water.main.infrastructure/. 
 22. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION OF THE LARGEST 75 CITIES: 1900 TO 2000 
(2003), available at https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/los_angeles_pop.pdf. 
 23. Kate Linebaugh, Detroit’s Population Crashes: Census Finds 25% Pluge as Blacks 
Flee to Suburbs, Shocked Mayor Seeks Recount, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 23, 2011), 
http://www.wsj.com/ articles/SB10001424052748704461304576216850733151470. 
 24. State and County QuickFacts: Detroit, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts. 
census.gov/qfd/states/26/2622000.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2014) [hereinafter Detroit 
QuickFacts]. 
 25. Agreement to Create Water Authority Guarantees Funding to Rebuild Regional 
System and Assist Customers in Need, CITY OF DETROIT (Sept. 9, 2014), 
http://www.detroitmi.gov/How-Do-I/Great-Lakes-Water-Authority [hereinafter Water Authority 
Agreement]. 
 26. Clark, supra note 4.  
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Detroit area, decreasing the ability for residents to pay and increasing 
the amount of delinquent water bills in Detroit.
27
  
B. Detroit City Water Shutoffs 
In March 2014, DWSD began shutting off water services to 
delinquent accounts, which made up about one-half of their 
customers.
28
 These water shutoffs led to extreme hardships for many 
Detroit residents.
29
 When the water was shut off, it was without 
warning, so residents could not prepare with water saved in buckets, 
sinks, or tubs.
30
 Sick individuals did not have running water or 
working toilets.
31
 If a resident returned home from surgery to a 
residence without water, they were unable to change bandages and 
could not carry out everyday tasks, such as cooking and bathing.
32
 On 
July 18, 2014, a coalition of four organizations released an open letter 
detailing the unlivable conditions Detroit residents faced during these 
shutoffs and issuing six recommendations to address these 
hardships.
33
  
 
 27. Id. As of July 2014, the average monthly water bill for a family of four in Detroit was 
$75, nearly twice the United States average. Id. 
 28. Mary M. Chapman, Detroit Shuts Off Water to Residents but Not to Businesses Who 
Owe Millions, DAILY BEAST (July 26, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/07/ 
26/detroit-shuts-off-water-to-residents-but-not-to-businesses-who-owe-millions.html (defining 
delinquent accounts as those that are 160 days past due or more than $150 behind in payments). 
 29. Helms & Guillen, supra note 1; see also Detroit Quickfacts, supra note 24 (stating 
that between 2008–2012, 38.1 percent of Detroit city residents lived below the poverty level in 
contrast to 16.3 percent living below the poverty level in Michigan). 
 30. PEOPLE’S WATER BOARD ET AL., supra note 5. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. PEOPLE’S WATER BOARD ET AL., supra note 5, at 7. 
Recommendations:  
 1. We call on the State of Michigan and the U.S. government to respect the human 
right to water and sanitation.  
 2. We call on the city to restore services to households that have been cut off 
immediately.  
 3. We call on the city to abandon its plan for future cut-offs.  
 4. We call on the federal and state governments to work with the city to ensure a 
sustainable financing plan and rate structure that would prevent a transfer of utility‘s 
financial burden onto residents who are currently paying exorbitant rates for their 
water services.  
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Some Detroit residences experienced a reprieve when the DWSD 
suspended water shutoffs for fifteen days “to continue public efforts 
encouraging delinquent account holders to get up-to-date.”34 This 
moratorium was later extended to August 25, 2016.
35
 The day after 
the moratorium on water shutoffs to delinquent customers ended, 
August 26, 2014, residents lost access to tap water when the high 
temperature in Detroit reached 91 degrees Fahrenheit.
36
  
On the same day that the moratorium ended, Detroit Mayor Mike 
Duggan and DWSD Director Sue F. McCormick announced a ten-
point plan that attempted to assist residents with the consequences of 
the water shutoffs.
37
 The plan focused on the concerns of the state 
 
 5. We call for fair water rates for the residents of Detroit.  
 6. We call on the City of Detroit to implement the original water affordability 
program immediately. 
Id. 
 34. Rod Meloni, City of Detroit Delays Water Shutoffs 15 Days, CLICKONDETROIT (July 
21, 2014), http://www.clickondetroit.com/news/local/detroit-bankruptcy/city-of-detroit-delays-
water-shutoffs-15-days. 
 35. Editorial Bd., Detroit Water Department Extends Residential Shutoff Moratorium, 
CLICKONDETROIT (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.clickondetroit.com/news/detroit-water-
department-extends-residential-shutoffs-moratorium. 
 36. Weather History for KDET—August 2014, WEATHER UNDERGROUND, 
https://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/KDET/2014/8/26/DailyHistory.html?req_city=
&req_state=&req_statename=&reqdb.zip=&reqdb.magic=&reqdb.wmo= (last accessed Mar. 3, 
2016). 
 37. Detroit Water & Sewage Dep’t, DWDS 10 Point Plan, DWSD, http://www.dwsd.org/ 
downloads_n/announcements/general_announcements/DWSD-10-point-plan.pdf (accessed Oct. 
14, 2014). 
1. During the moratorium, which ends August 25th, DWSD will waive turn-on fees for 
customers whose water had been shut off, as well as all late payment penalties.  
2. To simplify getting into a payment plan, customers only need to present a valid state 
ID. Once a payment is made, service will be restored within 48 hours.  
3. Extend hours at DWSD Customer Care Centers . . . 
4. Increase staffing at the DWSD Call Center and extend hours . . .  
5. Cobo Water Fair August 23rd. A Water Affordability Fair will be held at Cobo 
Center Saturday August 23rd to give customers one last opportunity to connect with all 
of the DWSD and community resources available to them before the moratorium ends 
August 25th. 
6. Improve notification for customers in danger of shut-off . . .  
7. Implement an Affordable Payment Plan. Any resident with a delinquent account can 
enter into a 24-month “10/30/50” payment plan by coming to their local DWSD 
Customer Care Center, showing a valid state ID and paying down only 10 percent of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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government to minimize bankruptcy liabilities that the water bills 
arrearages would present, rather than the well-being of the residents 
without water. In April 2015, the ACLU reported that this ten-point 
plan was largely ineffective in helping people maintain up to date 
payments on water bills.
38
 
When the moratorium ended in August 2014, an action was 
brought in court to continue the moratorium, and on September 29, 
2014, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes ruled against the 
plaintiffs, agreeing that there was no constitutional right to water 
service and that a moratorium would discourage residents from 
paying their bills, and could potentially lead to high revenue drops for 
DWSD.
39
 Since this suit, the water shutoffs have continued, and as of 
December 2015, it was reported that twenty-three thousand 
residential water accounts were shut off since the beginning of 2015, 
with at least four thousand of those accounts never reconnected.
40
  
 
their past-due balance. (The previous down payment requirement was 30 percent of the 
past-due balance.)  
8. Provide financial assistance for low-income Detroit customers . . . To be eligible for 
Detroit Water Fund assistance, customers must be Detroit residents who: 
 • Have an outstanding balance between $300 and $1000; AND  
 • Maintain Average Water Usage for their household size; AND 
 • Are either enrolled in DTE’s Low Income Self-Sufficiency Plan (LSP); OR, 
 • Have income at or below 150 percent of the federal poverty level (for example, a 
family of 4 must have an annual income below $35,775). 
This funding is available on a first come first served basis and is subject to 
availability.  
9. Build Neighborhood Partnerships. . . We’ve established a support network to assist 
individuals who may not qualify for some of the DWSD assistance programs. Our 
partners include United Way 211, THAW, WAVE and Wayne Metro.  
10. Provide a clear way to give. 
Id. 
 38. FOOD & WATER WATCH, DETROIT NEEDS A WATER AFFORDABILITY PLAN 2 (2015), 
available at http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/sites/default/files/Detroit%20Water%20Plan 
%20IB%20May%202015.pdf (“In April 2015, an investigative reporter for the ACLU Michigan 
disclosed that of the 24,743 residential customers enrolled in the 10-point plan, only about 300 
were able to keep up with their payments, leaving 24,450 households to default.”). 
 39. Helms & Guillen, supra note 1. 
 40. Joel Kurth, Woman Who Survives on Rain Water to Get New Housing, DETROIT NEWS 
(Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-city/2015/12/23/woman-
survives-rain-water-get-new-housing/77834472/. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/17
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C. The Great Lakes Water Authority 
The GLWA is a forty-year plan involving the water distribution 
structure in southeastern Michigan.
41
 This deal is part of Detroit’s 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy restructuring plan, approved by US Bankruptcy 
Judge Steven Rhodes on November 7, 2014.
42
 Under the deal, DWSD 
still maintains ownership of the water supply infrastructure within 
Detroit city, but the GLWA will lease, operate, and make decisions
43
 
about the entire regional water and sewage system for forty years.
44
 
On October 9, 2014, Macomb County commissioners approved the 
articles of incorporation, officially putting the GLWA into place.
45
 
The GLWA consists of six appointees. The Mayor of Detroit 
appoints two members, county executives from Oakland, Wayne, and 
Macomb Counties each appoint one member, and the Governor of 
Michigan appoints the final member.
46
 Under the GLWA, these 
appointees will lease Detroit pipes outside of the city to Oakland, 
Wayne, and Macomb Counties in exchange for $50 million per year 
 
 41. Nathan Bomey & Matt Helms, Detroit, Suburbs OK Regional Water Deal; $50M 
Yearly to Upgrade System, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.freep.com/ 
story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2014/09/09/detroit-to-make-major-water-deal-announcement/ 
15323795/. 
 42. Id.; Fletcher, supra note 10; Mary Williams Walsh, Detroit Emerges from Bankruptcy, 
Yet Pension Risks Linger, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/ 
11/11/detroit-emerges-from-bankruptcy-pension-risk-still-intact/; Monica Davey & Mary 
Williams Walsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles Into Insolvency, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/detroit-files-for-bankruptcy.html?pagewanted=all&_ 
r=0 (On July 18, 2013 the city of Detroit filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy in the Eastern District 
of Michigan United States Bankruptcy Court. Detroit’s debt was estimated to be between $18 
billion and $20 billion at the time). 
 43. The articles of incorporation states: “The Authority shall be a public body corporate 
with the power to sue and be sued in any [Michigan] court.” Most decisions are made by 
majority vote. Great Lakes Water Auth., Articles of Incorporation of Great Lakes Water 
Authority, OAKLAND COUNTY MICH. (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.oakgov.com/exec/Documents/ 
great_lakes_water_authority/All_Comments_Clean_Final_090814_GDP.pdf. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Turk, supra note 11. 
 46. Bomey & Helms, supra note 41. Each appointee to the GLWA will have an initial 
three-year term with subsequent four-year terms. The appointee by the governor, however, will 
have an initial term of four years. Five of six votes will be required to make any major changes, 
such as a rate change. Water Authority Agreement, supra note 25 (“These include decisions 
relating to rates, budgets, contracting, and selection of management.”). 
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to be used for infrastructure upgrades, while $4.5 million will be set 
aside to help low-income residents pay utility bills.
47
 
The agreement between the counties that approved the GLWA’s 
articles of incorporation mandates that Oakland County be 
responsible for $12 million of the rent payment, Detroit be 
responsible for $17 million, and Macomb and Wayne Counties each 
be responsible for $10.5 million.
48
 The GLWA is not publicly funded, 
but instead is completely funded by ratepayers.
49
 
The GLWA, managed by an appointed government of individuals 
from several counties and municipalities around southeastern 
Michigan, moves away from the traditional role of the government 
which “[f]unctions by allocating resources through city-managed 
departments with an emphasis on community input. The traditional 
model is concerned primarily with its social mission—to provide 
adequate quality and a voice to citizens.”50 The GLWA, by contrast, 
is a system that puts management in the hands of another entity and 
leases assets rather than focusing on its social mission or its own 
citizens.
51
 
Detroit’s tendency to move away from representation in municipal 
government operation became apparent prior to the GLWA. In 2011, 
the Michigan legislature passed Public Act Four, also known as “The 
Emergency Manager Law.” The law allowed the state government to 
appoint an “emergency manager” to govern financially unstable 
cities.
52
 Some argue that this legislation weakens the authority of 
 
 47. Bomey & Helms, supra note 41. 
 48. Turk, supra note 11. 
 49. Id.  
 50. John M. Zervos, Detroit in Transition: The Restructuring of Governance Through 
Privatization and Corporatization, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 22, 2012), http://www.huffington 
post.com/john-m-zervos/detroit-privitization_b_1291869.html. 
 51. Id.; Water Authority Agreement, supra note 25. 
 52. Zervos, supra note 50. Emergency Financial Managers could intervene and “possess 
unilateral tools for immediate change, including increased powers and specific training in 
corporate efficiency and privatization.” Id.; Mich. Pub. Acts 4, 96th Leg. (2011). This law 
showcased a preliminary move away from representative government in Detroit to a 
government based on appointments. Michigan Governor Rick Snyder signed this bill into law 
on December 27, 2012. WXYZ.com Web Staff, Governor Rick Snyder signs new Michigan 
emergency manager bill into law, WXYZ DETROIT (Dec. 27, 2012), http://www.wxyz. 
com/news/governor-rick-snyder-signs-new-michigan-emergency-manager-bill-into-law. The 
Michigan government appointed Kevyn Orr as an emergency manager handing over control of 
the financial management of the city of Detroit. Monica Davey, Bankruptcy Lawyer Is Named 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol51/iss1/17
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municipal governments in governing their own affairs and allows the 
state to substitute its authority for that of local governance.
53
 Others, 
such as U.S. Congressman John Conyers, are concerned that while 
facially neutral, this legislation appears to be an initiative directed at 
municipalities with a higher proportion of African American 
residents.
54
 While not directly related to distribution of utilities in 
Detroit, this showcased that Detroit has previously allowed outside 
authority to take over in the midst of financial crisis. Additionally, 
this suggests that the city has a tendency to allow outside 
representation for communities that are largely made up of people of 
color. 
D. Alternatives to the Great Lakes Water Authority 
1. Bankruptcy and Cities 
As Michelle Wilde Anderson pointed out in a 2014 article, cities 
facing bankruptcy are in a unique situation: the “creditors” are often 
retirees of the city hoping to collect their earned pension.
55
 The city 
government’s duty in this situation is to protect public safety and 
public health.
56
 Anderson argues that “new minimal city 
governments,”57 or governments required to significantly cut services 
as cities approach bankruptcy, are unable to focus on anything other 
than violent crime and fire.
58
 
 
to Manage an Ailing Detroit, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/ 
15/us/gov-rick-snyder-kevyn-orr-emergency-manager-detroit.html?_r=0. 
 53. Meg Cramer, 7 Things to Know About Michigan’s Emergency Manager Law, MICH. 
RADIO (Dec. 6, 2011), http://michiganradio.org/post/7-things-know-about-michigans-emergency-
manager-law#stream/0. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1123 
(2014).  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1122 (“Years, if not decades, of budget cuts and asset sales have left little 
beyond a stripped-down version of core service functions like irregular police and fire 
protection, rudimentary sanitation, and water supply. School districts continue to manage 
education (albeit with budget woes of their own), but the city government itself is no longer 
pursuing a vision beyond public safety in true emergencies.”). 
 58. Id. at 1125–26 (“Whatever the service demands of an impoverished shrinking city 
might be, in a time of state and federal deficits and redistributive intolerance, local fiscal crisis 
means that city governments must get smaller . . . I consider the adaptations according to a 
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While Anderson focuses specifically on Detroit as one of her case 
studies, her proposal for reforming financially struggling city 
governments more broadly is a significant shift from the way cities 
currently operate. Anderson proposes a “re-engineering/modification 
of city utility systems,”59 which would include taking some 
neighborhoods in highly depopulated areas off of the utility grid.
60
 To 
offset the negative effect on residents, she proposes programs such as 
resident relocation grants, or grants to establish other methods of 
water and sanitation for the individuals that wish to stay in their 
residences.
61
 Anderson also proposes that the local government 
provide a warranty of habitability for neighborhoods, which would 
include access to clean water and access to wastewater disposal.
62
 
These procedures would provide grounds for individuals to enforce 
their access to necessary services. 
2. Special Purpose Government versus Regional and Local 
Governments 
Legal scholars have similarly analyzed how particular forms of 
government affect the citizens of the city in which they operate.
63
 
Kathryn Ann Foster introduces the idea of public authorities, 
governmental units such as the GLWA, which she defines as 
 
three-part framework that describes the main purpose of local government spending, namely: to 
provide services (including economic development), to maintain land and equipment for public 
use, and to regulate public safety. Because there is very little that insolvent cities can do to 
increase revenues, cities are cutting services, selling assets, and reconsidering their land 
regulations.”). 
 59. Id. at 1196–97. 
 60. Id. (“However, when neighborhoods are substantially depopulated (e.g., by more than 
eighty percent, as in large swathes of residential Detroit) rather than simply poor, a creditors’ 
efficiency metric might well favor the decommissioning of underground utilities and some 
aboveground services to those areas. Though it is more sensible in this setting, it is not a 
practical measure for short-term savings.”). 
 61. Id. at 1197. 
 62. Id. at 1197–98. 
 63. See generally Frug, Beyond Regional Government, supra note 14; Keith Aoki et al., 
(In)visible Cities: Three Local Government Models and Immigration Regulation, 10 OR. REV. 
INT’L L. 453 (2008); Matthew J. Parlow, Revolutions in Local Democracy? Neighborhood 
Councils and Broadening Inclusion in the Political Process, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 81, 90 
(2010); Anderson, supra note 55, at 1127. 
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“government corporations without property-taxing powers.”64 While 
other government units largely rely on taxes, Foster states that 
“[p]ublic authorities raise most revenues through user fees, grants, 
and private revenue bonds.”65 Public authorities are authorized for a 
specific purpose, and the appointment of individuals to these 
governments can be done in a number of ways, including by vote or 
by appointment by a public official.
66
 After a government creates a 
special purpose entity, this entity has significant independence from 
the state and city governments.
67
  
Building on Foster’s work, Gerald Frug looks at the interaction 
between local government and the larger region in which these 
governments operate.
68
 Frug writes that special purpose governments, 
a type of public authority, have an advantage in the ease of their 
creation and their specific purpose to deal with a specific issue facing 
the city.
69
 However, since special purpose governments are often seen 
as the easiest answer to a problem, the large number of special 
purpose entities in any given area often leads to fragmentation and 
lack of coordination throughout a region.
70
 Additionally, Frug notes 
that within these special purpose entities, when the boards are 
appointed rather than elected, there is a lack of accountability.
71
 The 
complicated nature of special purpose governments can also lead to 
confusion, and they are often less cost effective.
72
 Frug elaborates 
that ad-hoc solutions, such as special purpose governments, are not a 
far-reaching solution to the problem of fragmented city and county 
governments, but merely a means to deal with one problem at a 
time.
73
 
 
 64. KATHRYN ANN FOSTER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SPECIAL-PURPOSE 
GOVERNMENT 7 (Georgetown U. Press 1997). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, supra note 14, at 1782. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. See also Aoki et al., supra note 63; Parlow, supra note 63; Anderson, supra note 
55. 
 69. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, supra note 14, at 1781. 
 70. Id. at 1783. 
 71. Id.; see also FOSTER, supra note 64. 
 72. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, supra note 14, at 1783; FOSTER, supra note 64. 
 73. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, supra note 14, at 1787. 
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After Frug’s discussion of the failure of ad-hoc solutions to 
comprehensively address problems in a city and region, he proposes 
the creation of a regional representative institution by a state’s 
legislature.
74
 Regional representative institutions would consist of 
“democratically elected representatives of the region’s cities, one that 
would put cities in control of their collective agenda rather than 
establish a centralized government.”75 The creation of this institution 
would likely stem from a specific issue, such as tax policy, 
transportation, or zoning.
76
 Something unique about this form of 
government is that while it has a set agenda, similar to special 
purpose governments, the institution would be able to expand its 
agenda beyond its original mission as issues arose.
77
 In this situation, 
if a problem confronting a region consisted of many different causes 
and influencing factors, the regional representative institution could 
expand its mission to also address the additional factors that were not 
directly related to the original mission.
78
 
For the creation of this type of government, Frug writes, there 
needs to be an issue that would motivate the state legislature to create 
a regional representative institution.
79
 Once a regional representative 
institution was put into place, however, this government could 
address issues that perpetuate inequality in the community more 
comprehensively, instead of focusing on one single problem, as with 
the narrow focus of special purpose governments.
80
  
 
 74. Id. at 1812. 
 75. Id. at 1766.  
American cities today do not have the power to solve their current problems or to 
control their future development . . . . Firm state control of city decision making is 
supplemented by federal restrictions on city power . . . . To build support for this new 
institution’s regional agenda, the state legislature should give it authority to deal with 
an issue that undeniably involves regional concerns (such as transportation). 
Gerald Frug, The City As A Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 6 (1980), at 1059. 
 76. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, supra note 14, at 1812–13. 
 77. The ability to expand its mission would explicitly include the power of the institution 
to deal with intra-regional inequality. Id. at 1766. 
 78. Id.; FOSTER, supra note 64, at 7. 
 79. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, supra note 14, at 1812–13. 
 80. Id. at 1820–21. 
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3. Community Involvement in Government 
Traditionally, public input in government settings has taken the 
form of public hearings, where individuals are able to address 
decision makers but there is little or no meaningful conversation.
81
 
Legal scholar and professor Barbara Bezdek argues that more 
comprehensive and useful forms of community involvement are task 
forces and advisory committees,
82
 which include more collaborative 
measures than public meetings and other forms of information 
giving.
83
 These more collaborative methods are time-consuming and 
take a significant amount of work,
84
 yet would give a voice to 
individuals in society whose rights have often been ignored.
85
 The 
hope would be that a diverse group could deliberate together, 
understand differing perspectives, and come to an informed, 
collaborative decision on issues.
86
  
 
 81. Bezdek, supra note 20, at 26–27. 
 82. Id. at 49 (“The premise of [a task force and an advisory committee], through the 
deliberative-democracy lens, is that representatives of diverse stakeholder groups will work 
together, gather and consider information, and come to appreciate others’ perspectives in 
reaching proposed solutions.”). 
 83. Id. at 48 (“[P]ublic meetings emphasize a one-way flow of information from officials 
to citizens, with highly constrained channels for feedback and, most tellingly, no power for 
negotiation.”). 
 84. Id. at 48. 
 85. Id. at 49.  
Inclusion to address the needs/concerns of the poorest and most disadvantaged means 
identifying those who are usually voiceless, or deliberately excluded, and building 
with them a process of trust and empowerment that allows them to see themselves as 
citizens, to feel entitled to a voice, to find the confidence to speak, and to find the 
means of participating. The benefits of intentional attentive inclusion are fairer and 
more just decision making, accurate targeting of funds (which can save money), 
stronger community spirit, and reduction of the effects of poverty and exclusion on 
individuals, families and communities. 
Id. 
 86. Id.  
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III. ANALYSIS/PROPOSAL 
A. The Great Lakes Water Authority: A Special Purpose Government 
Approach 
Under the control of DWSD, tens of thousands of Detroit 
residents were left without water, and without warning of shutoffs, in 
the middle of the summer.
87
 DWSD governance caused massive 
shutoffs, and its faulty infrastructure left residences to assume the 
costs of water main breaks.
88
 Under such governance and 
infrastructure, it was apparent that there needed to be a structural 
change in the provision of water in Detroit. The GLWA, 
implemented to provide this structural change, leaves Detroit as 
owner and therefore responsible for the southeastern Michigan water 
infrastructure results, but it diminishes the representation of Detroit 
citizens in the decision-making process.
89
 
The GLWA is, as Frug outlines, a special purpose government.
90
 
The GLWA, while easy to create and specific in its goal of water 
service, isolates the delivery of water from the broader context of the 
problem.
91
 The GLWA provides some financial resources to 
reconstruct the Detroit city water infrastructure,
92
 but it does not 
account for any larger restructuring of the oversized water 
infrastructure. The GLWA, with a majority of the representation 
delegated to representatives from outside of Detroit, fails to address 
many of the issues that go along with water service in Detroit, such as 
the rate of poverty paired with the high price of water in Detroit, 
which are two of the main reasons that so many cannot pay their 
water bills.
93
 The counties that hold representation within the GLWA 
have a disproportionate amount of wealth in comparison to Detroit, 
 
 87. Helms & Guillen, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
 88. Water Authority Agreement, supra note 25. 
 89. Detroit city residents previously had four representatives out of seven on the DWSD 
board of Water Commission (57 percent of the board), and will now only have two appointees 
from the City of Detroit out of six representatives (33 percent). Great Lakes Water Auth., supra 
note 43. 
 90. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, supra note 14, at 1782. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Water Authority Agreement, supra note 25. 
 93. PEOPLE’S WATER BOARD ET AL., supra note 5, at 3. 
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and therefore, they likely have different concerns and interests.
94
 
Because there is no specific measure put in place for community 
involvement in the GLWA’s decision-making process, it is unlikely 
that community concerns will be considered in southeastern 
Michigan’s water management.95 The GLWA structure lacks the give 
and take that, as Frug and Bezdek note, are essential to the fair and 
representative nature of local government law, specifically in the 
allocation of facilities.
96
 
Additionally, it is important to note that the GLWA, following in 
the trend of the Emergency Financial Manager law, is another move 
away from representation in Detroit.
97
 As a disenfranchised 
population, it is likely that this pattern will continue if there is not a 
refocus on productive ways of involving Detroit citizens in 
representation. The city of Detroit is increasingly being politically 
run by state appointees: individuals less connected with, and less 
concerned with, the realities of disparities in Detroit. 
B. Local Government Law: What Works? 
The GLWA reflects Frug’s discussion of special purpose 
governments and, more specifically, Foster’s definition of public 
authority.
98
 This type of government was created in a way that offers 
a relatively simple solution to the water crisis in Detroit. It provides 
$4.5 million in assistance to those who cannot afford water and offers 
a source of funding to repair and update the Detroit water system’s 
 
 94. For U.S. Census Bureau data that illustrates the difference in median household 
incomes between Detroit residents and surrounding counties, see Bouffard, supra note 8. 
 95. Detroit Water & Sewage Dep’t, supra note 37. 
 96. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, supra note 14; Bezdek supra note 20.  
 97. Zervos, supra note 50. 
 98. FOSTER, supra note 64, at 96 (citing DAVID OSBORNE AND TED GAEBLER, 
REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE 
PUBLIC SECTOR (Addison-Wesley, 1992)) (“The most fundamental, indeed definitional, 
difference between special-purpose and general-purpose governments is their degree of 
functional specialization. As their names imply, a general-purpose government provides a range 
of public services, whereas a special district performs a single or limited specified services.”). 
See generally JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S 
SCHOOLS (Brookings Institution Press 1990) (privatization in schools); JOAN ALLEN, THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR IN STATE DELIVERY: EXAMPLES OF INNOVATIVE PRACTICES (1989) 
(privatization in prisons).  
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plumbing.
99
 Special purpose governments, as noted by Foster, 
however, often falter in certain ways that general government units 
do not.
100
 For example, special purpose governments can delay the 
planning, financing, and delivery of services.
101
 Additionally, Frug’s 
argument that this type of government would be less responsive to 
public opinion is also true, as shown by the appointment of the 
GLWA members. The Detroit Mayor is only responsible for two of 
the positions appointed to the GLWA, when any decision made by 
the GLWA board requires a super-majority.
102
 This super-majority 
seriously diminishes, and perhaps eliminates, the power of the 
representatives for Detroit.  
Although Anderson’s proposal to restructure the utility system in 
response to city bankruptcy has some relevancy in Detroit, it may be 
too dramatic of a shift to benefit Detroit citizens.
103
 Restructuring the 
water system in Detroit may help with certain costs and accidents 
throughout the year, but Anderson’s argument to take certain 
neighborhoods completely off of the system does not seem to take 
into account the citizens who live in the neighborhoods affected: 
neither relocation assistance nor vouchers to find other ways to 
 
 99. Bomey & Helms, supra note 41. 
 100. FOSTER, supra note 64, at 96–97 (citing Norman Macrae, A Future History of 
Privatization, 1922–2022, ECONOMIST (Jan.1992). 
First, functional specialization may hamper coordination of the planning, financing, 
and delivery of services in metropolitan areas. General-purpose governments have the 
ability to coordinate capital investment and social programming. They may also “rob 
Peter to pay Paul” when revised resident priorities, state mandates, new labor 
contracts, or political events require a redirection of funds from one department budget 
to another. By contrast, functionally specialized governments have limited leeway to 
coordinate services or adjust budgets and programs in response to outside imperatives. 
 Second [], functional specialization may safeguard programs from capricious or 
merely convenient spending adjustments. . . .  
. . . [Third] specialized governments may threaten the viability of popular or needed 
services that depend on the budgetary refuge provided by service bundling.  
 Fourth, functional specialization offers a legal, inexpensive, and easily administered 
means for meeting minimalist or specialized service demands. . . . By the same token, 
functionally specialized districts also provide a legal escape from collective funding of 
specific services, possibly frustrating goals for redistribution. 
Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Water Authority Agreement, supra note 25. 
 103. Anderson, supra note 55. 
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receive services would be an adequate substitute to remaining in 
ones’ own home and receiving the necessary water services there.104 
Ignoring these individuals would break down the important, 
necessary focus on community. 
As previously mentioned, Bezdek argues that community 
involvement is an important aspect to city governance.
105
 In Detroit, 
the citizens without water are those that know what their community 
needs most intimately, and it is critical to include them in decision-
making in a meaningful way. Bezdek discusses how the public 
hearing setting does not allow for a true understanding of one’s 
perspective and interests.
106
 Her suggestion of a forum, such as a task 
force or advisory committee, made up of individuals representing 
diverse interests in the community,
107
 is highly unlikely to occur 
within the insulated GLWA, an authority that has representation from 
many different regions in southeastern Michigan region, but little 
representation from the Detroit area. This lack of representation is 
especially significant because those in Detroit are especially affected 
by these water shutoffs. 
C. Detroit Stakeholders 
The means used to address the water crisis in Detroit will affect 
many groups of people, some with more power than others. The 
citizens of Detroit, and customers of the city water service, have 
faced unique and extreme hardships with the water shutoffs and need 
a system that addresses both access to water and financing for 
water.
108
 With the GLWA, the citizens of Detroit are likely to lose 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Bezdek, supra note 20. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. PEOPLE’S WATER BOARD ET AL., supra note 5, at 5.  
Families concerned about children being taken away by authorities due to lack of 
water and sanitation services in the home have been sending their children to live with 
relatives and friends, which has an impact on school attendance and related activities. 
Teachers and social workers are required to contact authorities when they become 
aware that children are living without water at home 
 . . . .  
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much of their influence as they lack seats of representation. The 
stakeholders most represented by the members in the GLWA are the 
Michigan State Government and the county governments, which are 
now jointly controlling most of the water distribution after the 
GLWA leases the DWSD infrastructure.
109
 
Because the state government and county governments will likely 
receive an increased amount of representation and voice in the 
GLWA, it is important to focus on the Detroit citizens and how they 
are directly affected, often in a life-threatening way, by the 
management of the Detroit water supply. 
Additionally, financially imperiled Detroit and its residents are 
unduly burdened in the maintenance and updating of a water and 
sewage system that is nearly one hundred years old.
110
 It is critical 
that they be given an effective voice to fairly address these matters 
that will seriously impact them financially and politically. 
D. Proposal 
Prior to the GLWA, there was extreme structural instability in the 
maintenance and operation of the Detroit water system, due in part to 
the large and unstable infrastructure. This water infrastructure was 
designed at a time when the city was thriving and had a considerably 
larger population. The broken water mains, along with other 
inefficiencies of services, resulted in some of the highest water bills 
in the country. This infrastructure is no longer fit for the size of 
Detroit and it will require significant repair, restructuring, and 
upgrading to provide water to Detroit and the surrounding counties 
for years to come. 
As a short-term goal, I propose that Detroit and the surrounding 
counties in southeastern Michigan form a more collaborative, 
 
The MWRO says that even when people make efforts to pay a portion of their water 
bill, the water department will not turn their water back on unless they pay 30 per cent 
of the amount owing, which in many cases is thousands of dollars. In fact, the amount 
owing on people’s bills is often in dispute, and the water department is unwilling to 
restore service (or to halt the shut-off process) while the dispute is being resolved. 
Id. 
 109. Water Authority Agreement, supra note 25 
 110. CITY OF DETROIT WATER AND SEWERAGE DEPARTMENT, supra note 21. 
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responsive, representative institution, the Detroit Regional Water 
Institution (DRWI), that can address many inequalities that go into 
the Detroit Water Crisis. It is important that the institution allow 
cities to control the methods of water distribution, instead of a 
separate government body. The aforementioned representative 
institution can be founded on one issue: the distribution of water, but 
later adapt to meet the needs of the community, specifically focusing 
on the broader inequities associated with water distribution. This 
institution should have democratically elected representatives from 
all geographic areas affected by water service. When there is a 
problem with the service, the political influence provided by holding 
officials accountable through election would encourage the 
government to address issues comprehensively, taking into account 
what caused the problem originally. If, for example, the problem is 
created by a broken main, which caused a significant price increase, 
which then led to residents’ inability to pay bills, the underlying 
issues should be addressed. Because the water shutoffs have 
specifically affected Detroit residents, it is important that this 
institution comprise a representative population of those who have 
been and will continue to be affected. Representatives would be able 
to bring up issues that affect the citizens they represent. If inability to 
pay is an issue in one area, this matter could be introduced to the 
institution. Similarly, if zoning in a certain area is leading to water 
main breakages or inefficient water use, zoning ordinances could be 
the focus of that area’s representative. 
A representative institution alone will not allow residents’ 
concerns to be heard quickly. Residents are directly affected by each 
change to the water system, and they know from their lived 
experience what is most urgently in need of attention. It is essential to 
have a mechanism where residents can voice problems and be 
quickly and thoroughly understood. As Bezdek notes, one 
comprehensive way of receiving and incorporating resident feedback 
is an advisory committee that can bring issues that Detroiters are 
facing to the water council.
111
 It is important that the advisory 
committee include people from each area of the region served to 
 
 111. Bezdek, supra note 20, at 40–41. 
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represent their interests. It is especially important to have adequate 
representation of Detroit citizens, as they have experienced the most 
extreme consequences of water shutoffs in their homes without 
notice. 
Although an advisory board may entail more time and work 
initially, it would ultimately provide a more efficient and responsive 
system. A regional representative institution, focusing on the 
problems specific to Detroit residents would eliminate a guess and 
check process that impedes the goal of efficient water provision. It 
would also offer additional opportunities for community members to 
raise important problems, whether they were directly or indirectly 
connected to water distribution. 
A long-term goal of the DWRI should be a restructuring of the 
current water infrastructure. Consolidation of pipes in less populated 
areas, as well as the discontinuance of pipes in areas that are no 
longer occupied, are essential to streamlining the water distribution 
process. Additionally, identifying and responding to water main 
breaks as soon as they are brought to the institution’s attention would 
reduce the wasting of resources for the DWRI and for residents 
affected by the loss of water in their areas, as well as improve water 
supply to residents. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A representative institution that is governed by democratically 
elected officials and allows for city control of utilities would provide 
for a more representative and collaborative means of administering 
water to the Detroit area. The flexible agenda, while originally 
looking at issues of the water system in southeastern Michigan, 
would allow the institution to focus on problems that more broadly 
affect the community in receiving water, such as poverty, 
accessibility, and infrastructure problems, specifically water main 
breaks. 
The advisory board aspect of a new Detroit Regional Water 
Institution would be more likely to ensure that community members’ 
concerns and voices were included in decisions. While an advisory 
board would take more time and effort on behalf of the institution and 
its advisory board members, community representation would be a 
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central goal of the organization. The advisory board would be 
essential in deciding how the agenda would evolve over time. 
Additionally, a focus on repairs and consolidation, as well as the 
upgrading of the water infrastructure, will lead to significant savings 
in money spent on water; water that is currently pouring out into the 
street, uncontrolled, and unreported, wasting consumers’ resources 
and money. 
The Detroit City Water Crisis has brought international attention 
to the inadequacies and, as some argue, the human rights violations 
occurring in Detroit.
112
 As a response to this attention and to the 
serious problems with the water and sewerage infrastructure, the 
GLWA was approved as part of the Detroit bankruptcy-restructuring 
plan. While changes were needed from the former DWSD 
management, under which the shutoffs occurred, this shift does not 
adequately resolve the existing problems. Community representation 
relating to water distribution in Detroit is critical to respond to the 
problems the residents are facing daily. It is essential for a change to 
occur, taking into account the voices of Detroit residents whose 
livelihoods, health, and well being depend on access to water in their 
community and their homes. This change, however, needs to be 
accomplished in an equitable way that allows for fair representation 
of Detroit residents. Further, systems relying on community 
representation may present opportunities to prevent crises such as the 
water shutoffs in Detroit, therefore avoiding the significant hardship 
on Detroit residents. 
 
 112. U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Comm’r, supra note 1. 
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